The fragility of climate, human responsibility and finding the impetus to act decisively – investigating the potential of the ethics of care by Karen, Morrow
The Fragility of Climate, Human Responsibility and Finding the Impetus to Act 
Decisively―Investigating the Potential of the Ethics of Care 
 
Karen Morrow 
Professor of Environmental Law 
University of Swansea/Prifysgol Abertawe, United Kingdom 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
Human rights-based approaches are, after a lengthy gestation,1 emerging as a leading 
potential response to a partly socially2 and increasingly ecologically generated consciousness 
of humanity’s embeddeness in and consequent vulnerability to changes in the environment in 
general,3 and to climate change in particular.4 That human rights have a potentially 
significant role to play in this regard is now perhaps a given,5 if controversial on both 
particulars and some practicalities.6 The potential of human rights-based claims to address at 
least some issues of inter-societal equity (albeit for the most part on an individualistic rather 
                                                          
1 See. for example, the enlightening contextual discussion of the problematic nature of the human 
rights/development/environment interface in Philip Alston, ‘Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the 
Human Rights and Development Debate seen through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals’ (2005) 
27(3) Human Rights Quarterly 755. 
2 See for example, Neil Leary, Cecilia Conde, Jyoti Kulkarni, Anthony Nyong, Juan Pulhin (eds), Climate 
Change and Vulnerability (Earthscan, 2008), which raises gender, race and class as among socially salient 
considerations in the context of climate change. 
3 See for example, Will Steffen et al., ‘Planetary Boundaries: Guiding human development on a changing 
planet’ (15 January 2015) Science Express 1, available at  <http://www-ramanathan.ucsd.edu/files/pr210.pdf> 
[accessed on November 28th, 2017].  
4 There is a wealth of scholarship in this area, see for example, John Knox ‘Linking Human Right and Climate 
Change and the United Nations’ (2009) 33 Harvard Environmental Law Review 477; and Stephen Humphries 
(ed), Human Rights and Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
5 See for example the UNHRC-commissioned Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights 
obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, A/HRC/31/52, 01 
February 2016 available at  
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Environment/SREnvironment/Pages/ClimateChange.aspx> [accessed on 
December 11th, 2017]; and UNEP/Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Michael Burger, Jessica Wentz et al.: 
Climate Change and Human Rights (UNON Publishing Services Section, 2015), available at 
<http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2016/06/Burger-and-Wentz-2015-12-Climate-Change-and-Human-
Rights.pdf> [accessed on December 11th, 2017]. 
6 See, for example, Sumudu Atapattu, Human Rights Approaches to Climate Change: Challenges and 
Opportunities (Routledge, 2016). 
than a collective level7) for example, is strongly arguable. However, even where solely inter-
human claims are in play, the capacity of human rights to address other key issues, such as 
intergenerational equity concerns, is, given the inherent constraints of prevalent models of 
rights-bearing, considerably less convincing.8 In any case, the instrumental treatment that 
human rights claims accord to the environment means that they are ill-equipped (and perhaps 
even unable) to respond fully to ecological realities.  
This chapter argues that human rights-based approaches cannot, in isolation, bear the weight 
of the considerable societal challenges that climate change poses and will pose at all levels 
from the local to the planetary. The central contention here is that, ongoing climate change 
being acknowledged as substantially (though not solely) anthropogenic9 in nature and with 
the whole of humanity being implicated (albeit to highly varying degrees),10 any effective 
approach to addressing it also requires the adoption of a workable conception of human 
responsibility. 
The notion of responsibility has long been present in international environmental law, for 
example, in the preamble to the Stockholm Declaration, where it appeared in a particularly 
expansive form, embracing not only states, the traditional subjects of international law, but 
also extending to citizens, communities and enterprises.11 Nevertheless, it remains the case 
that, despite the ostensible change in tack prompted by the advent of sustainable development 
                                                          
7 Latterly there has been some development in addressing collective rights claims in environmental contexts, 
predominantly with reference to indigenous peoples, see, for example, Evadne Grant, ‘International Human 
Rights Courts and environmental human rights: re-imagining adjudicative paradigms’ (2015) 6(1) Journal of 
Human Rights and the Environment 156.  
8 See, for example, Burns H, Weston, Tracy Bach, Climate Legacy Initiative, Climate change, human rights and 
intergenerational justice (Vermont Law School, 2009); and Lynda Collins, ‘Environmental Rights for the 
Future? Intergenerational Equity in the EU’ (2007) 16(3) Review of European, Comparative & International 
Environmental Law 321. 
9 Notably the ongoing, painstaking work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and in 
particular, IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report Summary for Policy Makers (2014), available at 
<https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf> [accessed on December 
11th, 2017]. 
10 While it is not possible to deal with this within the confines of this chapter, it is acknowledged that 
responsibility for climate change varies enormously at both state and individual level and that there is a vast 
literature on this, see, for example, Christopher D. Stone, ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in 
International Law’ (2004) 98 American Journal of International Law 276; and Wouter Peeters, A. De Smet, L. 
Diependaele, S. Sterckx, Robert H. McNeal and Andries De Smet, Climate Change and Individual 
Responsibility: Agency, Moral Disengagement and the Motivational Gap (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).  
11 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, online http://un-
documents.net/unchedec.htm, accessed 11 December 2017, preamble, para 7. Discussed in Karen Morrow, 
‘Sustainability, environmental citizenship rights and the ongoing challenges of reshaping supranational 
environmental governance’ in Anna Grear and Louis Kotze (eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and 
the Environment (Edward Elgar, 2015). 
at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, 
states remain, by some measure, the prime movers in international law, not least in the 
environmental sphere and in human rights contexts they continue to be primarily (though in 
practical terms not solely) responsible for securing the rights of their citizens.12  
Remarkably, given the sustainability-dominated context in which it emerged on to the 
international stage at the UNCED, efforts to address climate change in the 1992 United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC),13 were, in the first instance 
almost entirely state-centric.14 In this largely inter-state context, responsibility, and in 
particular the concepts of equity and common but differentiated responsibility featured 
prominently as elements in the international regime from the first, though their practical 
implementation remains the subject of profound15 and ever-more complex16 disagreement.  In 
terms of regime reach, the development of participation agenda that also emerged from Rio, 
prompted in large part by Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration,17 coupled with the 
comparatively swift realisation that the nature and complexity of climate change necessitated 
a broader stakeholder approach to address it, saw a change in tack in the global climate 
change regime. This was characterised by an ostensible shift towards greater engagement 
with a range of non-state actors, though some aspects of the orientation of this move, its 
depth, and durability, remain open to question.18 That said, rationale for broader stakeholder 
participation in the global climate change regime thus far tends to be couched in a 
                                                          
12 Critiqued for example, in Andrew Kuper (ed), Global responsibilities: Who Must Deliver on Human Rights? 
(Routledge, 2005) which interrogates the concept of responsibility and examines various means to extend it 
beyond the state, to non-state actors, including individuals. 
13 Available at  
<http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf> 
[accessed on December 11th, 2017]. 
14 See Karen Morrow, ‘Climate Change, Major Groups and the Importance of a Seat at the Table: Women and 
the UNFCC Negotiations’ in Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers/Policy Paper, The 
Dominance of Climate Change in Environmental Law: Taking Stock for Rio+20 (RSCAS 2012), available  at 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/24994/RSCAS_2012_67.pdf> [accessed on December 11th, 2017]. 
15 See, for example, Kevin R. Gray, Cinnamon Piñon Carlarne, Richard Tarasofsky (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press, 2016). 
16 See, for example, Anita M. Halvorssen, ‘Common, but Differentiated Commitments in the Future Climate 
Change Regime — Amending the Kyoto Protocol to Include Annex C and the Annex C Mitigation Fund’ 
(2007) 18 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 247. 
17 Available at <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm/> [accessed on December 
11th, 2017]. 
18 See for, example, Karen Morrow, ‘Changing the climate of participation: the gender constituency in the 
global climate change regime’ in Sherilyn MacGregor (ed), Routledge Handbook of Gender and Environment 
(Routledge, 2017). 
combination of rights-claims and efficacy arguments19 (in particular, relating to adaptation) 
rather than on any explicit notion of human responsibility. 
In any case, progress under the global climate change regime remains consistently inadequate 
to address even relatively conservative (as opposed to worst-case scenario) forecasts of the 
environmental challenges that we face in this regard.20 It is clear that the putative advent of 
the Anthropocene21 demands a paradigm shift in how our understanding of the relationship 
between humanity and the wider environment. It is also the case that, at least insofar as 
climate change is concerned, human responsibility is a necessary element of this 
(re)accommodation process, though we seem set to continue to argue to the point of our 
extinction as a species as to its extent. In this context, it is imperative that we find ways to 
engage more effectively with climate change. In consequence, this chapter looks at the notion 
of human responsibility22 as a foil to rights-based approaches that could provide the impetus 
to kickstart more positive and efficacious engagement with climate change. To this end it 
interrogates the possibilities of applying an ecologically-informed iteration of a 
(responsibility-rooted) feminist ethics of care approach in this context. In so doing, it is 
suggested that, in contradistinction to earlier statements of the ethics of care, environmental 
issues, far from (at best) constituting a potentially appropriate ‘add on’ to the human-focussed 
concepts that populate this moral stance to motivate action, are in fact practically and 
logically integral to it. That this is type of approach is arguable in principle is borne out by 
some areas of professional care ethics, for example, considering links between nursing, a core 
                                                          
19 See, for example, the Submission of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to the 21st 
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, available at 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/COP21.pdf> [accessed on December 11th, 2017]. 
20 See UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2017: A UN Environment Synthesis Report, United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), Nairobi, available at 
<https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/22070/EGR_2017.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>  
[accessed on December 11th, 2017]. For press commentary see, for example, Tom Bawden, ‘COP21: Paris deal 
far too weak to prevent devastating climate change, academics warn’, The Independent (8 January 2016) 
available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/cop21-paris-deal-far-too-weak-to-
prevent-devastating-climate-change-academics-warn-a6803096.html> [accessed on December 11th, 2017]; and 
Fiona Harvey, ‘Paris climate deal at risk unless countries step up plans, says watchdog’ (16 November 2016) 
The Guardian, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/nov/16/paris-climate-deal-at-risk-
unless-countries-step-up-plans-says-watchdog> [accessed on December 11th, 2017]. 
21 See Louis Kotze (ed), Environmental Law and Governance for the Anthropocene (Hart, 2017). 
22 Discussed in Karen Morrow, ‘Of Human Responsibility: Considering the Human/Environment Relationship 
and Ecosystems in the Anthropocene’ in op. cit.  
area in this field and its environmental ramifications, when applied to questions of public 
health.23  
 
II. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE NEED FOR COHESIVE HUMAN ENGAGEMENT 
WITH SYSTEMIC ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS 
 
i. The challenge of motivating action on climate change 
International environmental law has made some progress on climate change, at least insofar 
as developing a global regime that facilitates activity (if less action) but, unless explicitly 
driven by an ultimate, agreed and clearly expressed goal, namely, acting as required to 
promote the survival and flourishing of humanity, its impetus and impact will inevitably be 
limited. This is the more so as it is so easy to become bogged down in the many 
technicalities, unanswerable questions, and irresolvable conflicts of principle posed by 
climate change, about which we can argue endlessly without necessarily progressing 
significantly. Under the current trajectory, small successes, including those in the realm of 
rights, are occasionally to be won, albeit at great pains, when we can focus on practicalities, 
but absent grasping the necessary super-context, solving the root problem will elude us. 
Therein however lies the rub. Climate change can be variously classified as a multivalent, 
‘wicked’, or even ‘super wicked’ problem,24 this means it is “multifaceted in every respect 
[…]  incomplete, contradictory, and constantly changing.”25 Marshall observes that: 
[W]icked problems are complex. As a result, there is no point at which one has enough 
information to make a decision. Instead, wicked problems demand a continuous process 
of evaluation and redefinition. […] You can’t learn about a wicked problem without 
trying solutions, but every solution you try creates new consequences and new wicked 
problems.26 [emphasis in the original] 
Marshall also notes that, as a result of its multivalency:  
                                                          
23 Lydia Vieira Freitas, Emanuella Silva Joventino, Lorena Barbosa Ximenes, Neiva Francenely Cunha Vieira, 
Rui Verlaine Oliveira Moreira, ‘The ethics of nursing care for environmental crises’ (2012) 11(3) Online 
Brazilian Journal of Nursing 893. 
24 See Burger and Wentz, above n. 5, 2. 
25 See George Marshall, Don’t Even Think About It: Why our brains are wired to ignore climate change 
(Bloomsbury, 2014) 95. 
26 Ibid. 
[Climate change m]ore than any other issue […] exposes the deepest workings of our 
minds and shows our extraordinary and innate talent for seeing only what we want to see 
[…].27  
Drawing on a diverse range of behavioural scholarship, Marshall argues that we are in many 
ways psychologically ill-equipped to deal with climate change,28 resulting in a range of non-
responses ranging from “ignorance (not knowing), denial (refusal to know), and disavowal 
(the active choice not to notice)” 29 all of which share the same dangerous outcome: 
disengagement.  
The critical question is how to break down a complex problem that, if unaddressed, will 
escalate to potentially threaten human existence, into something we can not only grasp, but 
face up to and address? Insofar as climate change is concerned, much disengagement may be 
expressed as a form of akrasia, defined by Kretz as “weakness of the will or failing to do 
what one believes to be right.”30 This may be equated, at least in part, with a failure to take 
responsibility for our actions in both principle and in practice, which prompts questions about 
the factors contributing to akrasia in the seemingly compelling context of climate change and 
how best to address them. Marshall argues that, professional (and notably) scientific 
communication of the issues on which we tend to rely are in fact having limited effect in 
motivating and even more so, sustaining engagement. To remedy these ills, he posits that:31  
What climate change really needs are the voices of ordinary people who might not be 
fluent speakers or skilled orators but can bring an authenticity and genuine sense of 
common ownership to the issue.32 
He points to the power of ‘stories’ in this capacity as a means to engage our emotional brains 
in processing climate change and as a spur to action.33 The necessity of engaging not only the 
rational but also the emotional parts of the brain to motivate response to complex dilemmas is 
                                                          
27 See op. cit., 2. 
28 See op. cit., passim.  
29 See op. cit., 85. 
30 Lisa Kretz, ‘Climate Change: Bridging the Theory-Action Gap’ (2012) 17(2) Ethics & the Environment 9. 
31 “For the first ten or fifteen years, people’s understanding of the underlying science was the single most 
powerful predictor of their willingness to change their behavior or support government policy.”, as notes 
Marshall, above n. 25, 123, who points out also that ‘… then the issue became polluted by political and cultural 
meaning’ and ‘[b]y 2010 only 3% of people claimed not to grasp climate change’, op. cit. 124. 
32 See op cit. 119 
33 See op. cit., 105. 
also alluded to by Goralnik and Nelson.34 This type of understanding of what fuels human 
action prompts important questions, including: could addressing stories that reveal the 
practical implications of human vulnerability to climate change and developing a pragmatic 
approach to human responsibility founded thereon provide stronger levers for action than 
arguments drawn from abstract notions of moral responsibility currently do; and could an 
ethics of care-based approach provide a vehicle whereby to achieve this? 
 
ii. Introducing the ethics of care 
The roots of the ethics of care in feminist theory lie in consideration of the social allocation 
of reproductive (in the broadest sense of the word, concerning the whole range of life 
support) activity to women and the deduction of an ethical theory from the situated, dialogic, 
and relational reasoning that is applied to executing this undertaking. That said, the ways in 
which this is manifest on a day-to-day basis do vary widely, not least between the developed 
and developing world, but also on class and other axes. Although a full history of the ethics 
of care is well beyond the reach of this chapter, a brief sketch of its origins and development 
will serve to orientate discussion here. The concept emerged in the work of scholars such as 
Carole Gilligan35 and Nel Noddings,36 though in this chapter, for reasons of space, discussion 
will focus on the former scholar, whose approach to developing a gender literate counter to 
dominant (and in many ways wanting) justice-based ethical theory, in the context of care-
giving and the receipt of care, is of particular interest.  
Gilligan sought to articulate a counter-hegemonic, care-based approach to moral philosophy, 
that was as fit to engage with complex real-world problematics as the established justice 
paradigm, and which is particularly apposite for present purposes. When asked to define an 
ethics of care, Gilligan has described it as “grounded in voice and relationships, in the 
importance of everyone having a voice, being listened to carefully (in their own right and on 
their own terms) and heard with respect. An ethics of care directs our attention to the need for 
responsiveness in relationships (paying attention, listening, responding) and to the costs of 
                                                          
34 See Lissy Goralnik and Michael Nelson, ‘Forming a Philosophy of Environmental Action: Aldo Leopold, 
John Muir, and the Importance of Community’ (2011) 42(3) Journal of Environmental Education 181. 
35 See, for example, Carole Gilligan, In A Different Voice (Harvard University Press, 1982). 
36 See, for example, Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (University of 
California Press, 1982). 
losing connection with oneself or with others. Its logic is inductive, contextual, 
psychological, rather than deductive or mathematical.”37 
The strongly feminist grasp of the particularised and perspectival nature of knowledge that 
Gilligan’s work imports as central elements of her ethical framework has enormous potential 
to re-shape how we think about moral issues. Furthermore, the observational and dialogic 
nature of knowledge that care fosters and the responsibility-centred notion of power that 
follows from it can be viewed as extending beyond the human relationships/inter-
relationships that Gilligan concerns herself and which form its centre, As Gilligan observes: 
 [T]he ethics of care starts from the premise that as humans we are inherently 
 relational, responsive beings and the human condition is one of connectedness or 
 interdependence.38 
 
iii. Framing the Ethics of Care Through an Eco-feminist Lens 
Re-framing the ethics of care to accommodate environmental issues is facilitated by the fact 
that the core elements of such an approach sits well with eco-feminist philosophies. As 
Stephanie Lahar puts it, most versions of ecofeminism are, accommodatingly, concerned with 
“the interrelationship and integration of personal, social and environmental issues and the 
development of multidirectional political agendas and actions.”39 
Lahar suggests a framework for considering ecofeminism that can arguably be applied to an 
ecological iteration of the ethics of care, drawing on the potential for strong commonalities 
between the two areas and deploying the former to support an ecologically expanded iteration 
of the latter. First, Lahar argues that eco-feminism can be framed as a moral theory, an 
approach that Galligan also applies to the ethics of care, and which is rooted in like fashion. 
Lahar states that:  
 [A] moral theory must emerge out of a felt sense of need and personal connection 
 with the issues at hand, not just out of an abstract process of reasoning.40 
                                                          
37 ‘Gilligan Interview’, June 21st, 2011, available at <https://ethicsofcare.org/carol-gilligan/> [accessed on April 
4th, 2018]. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Stephanie Lahar, ‘Ecofeminist Theory and Grassroots Politics’ in Karen J. Warren (ed), Ecological Feminist 
Philosophies (Indiana University Press, 1996) 2. 
40 See op. cit., 9. 
Lahar’s specific objective is to develop ecofeminism as an “action-guiding ethical theory”41 
and she identifies the key task here as “incorporating the integrity of individual and collective 
realities is an expanded concept of nature that we, as gendered human beings, can then find 
our place in.”42 Second, and relatedly, Lahar tasks the philosophical approach developed with 
integrating humanity and nature. Lahar’s third and fourth considerations relate to the 
practicalities of developing ecofeminism as a dynamic process driven by those who theorise 
and deploy it; and which maintains an “active political and participatory emphasis that is both 
deconstructive … (reactive to current injustices) and reconstructive (proactive in creating 
new forms of thinking and doing).”43 
Whilst applying the first two elements of Lahar’s approach to the ethics of care requires a 
case to be made, which will be developed below, the latter considerations are fairly central to 
feminist philosophy and ethics more generally, albeit with a strong praxis element that is 
characteristic of ecofeminism. These are however already effectively shared with the 
iterative, experience-driven, and paradigm-challenging aspects of an ethics of care approach. 
As the ethics of care acknowledges, the human condition is indeed concerned centrally with 
human relationships, but this is not an exclusive focus and in ecological terms these 
connections are themselves grounded in our relationship with the natural world. The concepts 
of connection, knowledge, power, and responsiveness that characterise Gilligan’s ethics of 
care can then and indeed must also be applied to the human relationship with nature because 
our interdependence with it too is pervasive and inevitable. Our related responsibility to care 
for the environment in return for its nurturing of our species, it is founded not only on moral 
grounds, but as we now recognise with a new clarity, on survival, the most practical of 
motivations. We now, belatedly, recognise (or recall44) that our very survival as a species is 
(inter)dependant with that of the biosphere, and in light of this it behoves us to urgently 
fashion a new responsive dialogue with the world around us.  
                                                          
41 See op. cit., 10. 
42 Ibid. 
43 See op. cit., 8. 
44 See Ian D Rotherham, Eco-History: An Introduction to Biodiversity and Conservation (White Horse Press, 
2014) which points to the ill-recalled environmental literacy of generations past; and Benjamin J. Richardson, 
‘The Ties that Bind: Indigenous Peoples and Environmental Governance’ (2008) Comparative Research in Law 
& Political Economy. Research Paper No. 26/2008, available at 
<http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/197> [accessed on May 8th, 2018], which discusses the 
complexities of indigenous approaches to environmental governance as alternates to the dominant paradigm. 
While nature cannot ‘speak’ for itself, the same is true for many of the human subjects of care 
(for example, infants and those operating under a range of disabilities); in these cases, and 
where nature too is concerned, this does not preclude dialogue, as human agents can speak on 
behalf of those/that which cannot.45 Furthermore, at a very basic level, observation often 
signals that  human activity is impinging on the ability of species and ecosystems to 
flourish.46 Ultimately then, morality, philosophy, and human advocacy aside, environmental 
degradation and deterioration speak volumes in themselves in ways that, regardless of their 
often-imperceptible origins, become manifest and measurable.47 Both morally and practically 
then, it has never been more imperative that we grasp the import of care in observing, 
understanding, and acting on nature’s limits,48 with which our own are intimately enmeshed, 
rather than blindly continuing to pursue a supposed and ultimately illusory mastery49 over 
non-human nature, on which we rely. 
 
iv. The potential of the ethics of care to extend to the public domain  
Recognition of the potential to extend the ambit of the ethics of care approaches is not novel, 
as while well-established in feminist theory, the approach is not siloed therein. The ethics of 
care has, for example, often been applied to the ‘caring professions’,50 and has been rolled 
out into with some success in relation to moral philosophy51 but this chapter argues, in 
common with emerging scholarship in the latter area,52 that its practical application has the 
potential to extend much more widely and in particular to be applied to human/environment 
                                                          
45 Discussed for example, in the ground-breaking Christopher Stone, ‘Should Trees Have Standing? — Towards 
Legal Rights for Natural Objects’ (1972) 45 Southern California Law Review 450. 
46 See for example work on earth-centred governance such as Thomas Berry, ‘Ten Principles for Jurisprudence 
Revision’ in Thomas Berry (ed), Evening Thoughts Reflecting on Earth as Sacred Community (Sierra Club 
Books, 2006). 
47 Steffen et al., above n. 3. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (Routledge, 1993). 
50 See, for example, Tula Brannelly, Lizzie Ward, and Nicki Ward (eds), Ethics of Care: Critical advances in 
international perspective (Policy Press, 2015); and Marita Nordhaug and Per Norvedt, ‘Justice and Proximity: 
Problems for an Ethics of Care’ (2011) 19 Health Care Analysis 3. 
51 See, for example, Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global (Oxford University 
Press, 2005). 
52 See, for example, Fiona Robinson, The Ethics of Care: A Feminist Approach to Human Security (Temple 
University Press, 2011); Lissy Goralnik, Kelly F. Millenbach, and Michael P. Nelson, ‘An Environmental 
Pedagogy of Care: Emotion, Relationships, and Experience in Higher Education Ethics Learning’ (2012) 35(3) 
Journal of Experiential Education 412; and Freitas et al., above, n. 23. 
relationships in the fullest sense. In this regard, there is an important strand of scholarship 
promoting a broad application of the ethics of care, reaching beyond its ostensibly private 
sphere origins,53 which will help to ground discussion.  
For present purposes this will be represented by Helena Olofsdotter Stensota’s public ethics 
of care, which offers particular promise for the purposes of this chapter. 54 In developing her 
approach, Stensota builds to good effect on aspects of Joan Tronto’s much earlier work in the 
field, wherein the latter observed that care is something that extends its reach to all human 
endeavour, applying to “everything we do to maintain and reproduce ourselves and “the 
world” so that we can live in it as well as possible.”55 While Tronto was criticised by some 
for taking too wide an approach to care, her view is in fact a logical one, as the boundaries of 
care and its ethics are not confined to the family responsibilities, or even the ‘caring 
professions’ of its origins and early application, but rather, as Bowden observes, open to a 
whole range of “ethical possibilities.”56  
Stensota’s public ethics of care, is grounded on four core notions. These comprise: first, 
interdependence—which in common with my own view sees humans “as being 
interdependent at all points in time, as we are connected through relations  with other people 
or our surroundings—without which we would most definitely die.”57 
Second, Stensota points to the significance of relations in her approach to care, focussing on 
“establishing, nurturing, sustaining and protecting relationships of different kinds.”58 Here 
though I part company with Stensota to a degree as, while she invokes protection as being 
geared toward the goal of ‘not-hurting’ this seems to me to be a rather limited definition of 
the concept and I would instead regard this element of an ethics of care approach in more 
ambitious terms, in concert with Thomas Berry,59 as promoting the flourishing of the object 
of care. 
                                                          
53 See for example, Peta Bowden, Gender-sensitive Ethics (Taylor and Francis, 1996). 
54 Helena Olofsdotter Stensota, ‘Public Ethics of Care — A General Public Ethics’ (2015) 9(2) Ethics and Social 
Welfare 183. 
55 See Joan Tronto, Moral Boundaries, A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (Routledge, 1994) 103. 
56 See Bowden, above n. 53, 197. 
57 See Stensota above, n. 54, 189-190. 
58 Ibid. 
59 See Berry, above n 46, 149-150. 
Third, Stensota’s approach features the concept of responsibility as centrally important, and 
she points to its assumption as crucial, but to a lawyer’s reading her approach seems in fact to 
be more concerned with its recognition, which is not quite the same thing. Nonetheless 
Stensota does clearly articulate responsibility as “attached to the handling of problems.”60 In 
this context Stensota characterises the environment as a ‘new’ problem to be dealt with by the 
public ethics of care. While one may contest the claim to novelty, the application of an ethics 
of care approach to environmental issues certainly raises exciting possibilities.61 
The fourth element of Stensota’s construction of the ethics of care comprises context 
sensitivity, wherein she promotes the situated rather than abstract treatment of issues, 62 
though she tends to equate this with a localised agenda. She states that public ethics of care 
“may function so as to strengthen environmental concerns in every discussion and 
deliberative talk regarding policies that affect the local context and green environment.”63 
This approach has some merit and would adequately represent the most straightforward 
elements of an ethics of care approach toward environmental issues. However, if this 
represented the full scope of the applicability of such an approach it would be of rather 
limited utility in seeking to address a multivalent issue like climate change, which while it 
has local manifestations, is also expressed at every other level of society, extending 
ultimately to the global. Below, the rationale for a much broader spatial scope for an ethics of 
care approach to the environment is developed, positing its potential applicability to all 
planes of human endeavour.  
With this in mind Stensota’s limitation of the sphere of application of the public ethics of care 
to what she terms the ‘green environment’ is also problematic Whilst this area of concern 
certainly falls within an ethics of care approach, it takes too narrow a view of the scope of 
human influence and in consequence, the morally imperative realm of human responsibility. 
If, as is now abundantly apparent, we can shape and distort the environment in all its forms 
and at all levels, from the microscopic to the global, to human ends, then we need to rethink 
the ambit of care. We depend on the environment for our own flourishing as a species and the 
biosphere increasingly depends on us for its flourishing (or otherwise) and any human 
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activity that generates substantial environmental impact at any scale is therefore ripe for 
reconsideration through the lens of care.  
In the alternative to Stensota’s argument for a ‘public’ ethics of care, there are particular 
considerations that serve to render the public/private divide at least insignificant, or even 
illusory, in environmental contexts. Thus, while the origins of the ethics of care are located in 
the private domain, this is not decisive in the context of its putative application to 
environmental behaviours. This is because, as Dobson observes, where the environment is 
concerned, private acts have public implications.64 Thus, as Barry states “when considered 
from an ecological point of view, [the private sphere] moves from being a ‘non-political’ to a 
political site of activity.”65  
Another way of looking at this issue is as apposite for the application of the well-worn 
feminist saw that the personal is political.66 If we take these points to their logical conclusion, 
then carrying out the day to day business of inter-human care, reproduction in its broadest 
sense, pertaining to the activities that sustain our lives and enable human flourishing, 
ultimately depends on the biosphere being in a condition that is conducive to our ends. In this 
view the environment functions as an essential object of care and human activity in all its 
many guises is ripe for consideration from an ethics of care perspective. 
 
III. CONCEIVING AN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS OF CARE AS A DRIVER FOR A 
PARADIGM SHIFT IN THE HUMAN/ENVIRONMENT RELATIONSHIP 
 
i. The Ethics of Care as a Potential Corrective to the Paradigm of Mastery 
Embracing an ethics of care-oriented approach to the relationship between humanity and the 
rest of nature arguably has the potential to secure human survival as a minimum, and if 
vigorously pursued, to facilitate human flourishing. In part this promise lies in consciously 
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recalling/recognising and acting upon the (re)discovered reality67 of humanity as situated 
within, rather than above nature. This grounding in ecological realism seems to offer a more 
effective direction of travel than a preoccupation with the assertion of rights, which 
significant as it may be in principle, often seems far divorced from practicalities. It is worth 
noting that, while applying an ethics of care line to the human/environment relationship 
would represent a considerable shift in perspective, it would be an evolutionary rather than a 
revolutionary move at base, shifting the paradigm rather than introducing an entirely new 
one, in that its orientation remains anthropocentric in nature.  
An ethics of care approach does however, does offer a considerable advance on the current 
position, eschewing a purely instrumental view of non-human nature, as it positions humanity 
as ecology suggests: as an integral part of the web of relationships that comprise the 
biosphere. Thus, an ethics of care-oriented approach offers a potential correction to the 
terminal hubris of what Plumwood eloquently terms the paradigm of mastery, drawn from 
Descartes and under which nature has come to be routinely viewed and treated “in 
instrumentalist terms as available without constraint for annexation and normalisation to fit 
human needs, as a mere thing for human use.”68 
The results of following the paradigm of mastery to its logical conclusion are arguably now 
beginning to become fully manifest as we enter the Anthropocene, as burgeoning human 
population and the increased sophistication of our science and technology serve to intensify 
rates of resource use and the quantity and complexity of the pollution we create as a by-
product of pursuing our various endeavours. Core impacts of the pursuit of mastery include, 
an over-indulged, vastly privileged minority in the human population, disconnected from the 
natural world, whose insatiable and endless drive to accumulate and consume places the 
earth-system under pressure as never before, as we bend nature to our short term aims in 
ways that profoundly damage the natural world.  
At the same time, the pursuit of mastery takes an inequitable toll on much of humanity, and 
in particular the poorest and the most vulnerable, who disproportionately shoulder the 
adverse impacts of the environmental degradation that the mechanics of mastery generate but 
benefit little from the short-term advancement that it generates—climate change providing a 
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prime example of this. My central contention in arguing for an environmental iteration of an 
ethics of care is that sustainable care for ourselves and other humans necessarily requires care 
for the environment in which we are enmeshed and on which we depend. In this context, 
ethics of care approaches offer an alternative basis upon which to proceed to the toxic 
paradigm of mastery and one that speaks not only to local experience of ecological limits, but 
which ultimately has the potential to extend its reach to address transgressing the safe-
operating spaces for humanity69 at regional and planetary boundary levels. 
While, as considered above, scholarship on the ethics of care tends to focus on its ethical 
locus70—important as that is (and applicable as it would be in the current context)—, I want 
at this point to focus on another, underexplored aspect of the ethics of care that is, I think 
crucial in the context of climate change. On re-examination the ethics of care reveals 
profound truths about the various sources of human vulnerability and agency. Here there are 
important commonalities between ethics of care approaches and feminist political ecology 
that support the contention that the former is not only salient to but essential in framing a 
realistic understanding of the human/environment relationship. There are many views of what 
form the core constituents of an ethics of care, I argue that the key composite elements which 
can be distilled from combining the ethics of care and ecological context to form an 
environmentally-rooted ethics of care constitute: relationships—both inter-human and 
human/environmental, characterised by vulnerability, connection and responsiveness; and 
care prompted and promoted through a combination of agency and responsibility.  
 
ii. Relationships (Human and Environmental): Vulnerability, Connection, and 
Responsiveness 
The relationships which are central to an ethics of care perspective hinge on the concept of 
human vulnerability. In the first instance, care is owed to human dependants in recognition of 
their vulnerability. At the same time, and enmeshed with this very intimate human 
interconnection, human vulnerability more generally is the product of our actual (and for 
future generations contingent) embodiment,71 being both in and of our environment. 
                                                          
69 See Steffen et al. above n. 3. 
70 See, for example, the ‘four attributes’ identified in Joan C. Tronto, in ‘An ethic of care’, in Ann E. Cudd and 
Robin O. Andreasen (eds), Feminist theory: a philosophical anthology (Blackwell, 2005). 
71 A complex and rapidly evolving area of academic study in itself, extending to both biological and 
nonbiological entities see, for example, Tom Quick, Kerstin Dautenhahn, Chrystopher L. Nehaniv and Graham 
Vulnerability here is particularly complex, operating simultaneously in situating humanity in 
an environment that ultimately renders us vulnerable, yet at precisely the same time that very 
environment is, now as never before, vulnerable to the impacts, both intended and 
unintended, of the exercise of human agency. Barry, in his discussion of ecological 
stewardship, makes observations that are also apposite in the current context, pointing to the 
need to recognise that we are entangled in “webs of dependence and vulnerability, those 
relationships between people, planet, and the two together, creating a community of 
dependence and vulnerability, the most appropriate attitude toward which is a disposition of 
responsibility, care, and mindfulness.72  
That we are intimately enmeshed in multiple layers of human relationships and are 
simultaneously in complex, multi-layered, and multi-faceted connection with the biosphere,73 
with all that these realities and the multifarious interactions between them entails in terms of 
survival and flourishing, is seemingly obvious, yet this fact (at best) exerts extremely limited 
influence on currently dominant patterns of human behaviour vis-à-vis the environment.74 It 
is also the case that the embodiment that we experience as humans is (amongst many other 
determining factors) gendered, and in part shaped by socially allocated daily work and caring 
responsibilities that are substantively distinct between the sexes.75 Vulnerability in both 
human and broader environmental contexts, is also in part socially imposed by human 
structures, and these too feature significant dimensions shaped by patriarchal structures and 
applied to women. In an environmental context the application of this insight is usefully 
underlined in feminist political ecology and the observation that “there are real, not 
imagined, gender differences in experiences of, responsibilities for and interests in “nature” 
and environments, but that these differences are not rooted in biology per se. Rather, they 
derive from the social interpretation of biology and social constructs of gender, which vary 
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by culture, class, race and place and are subject to individual and social change.” (emphasis 
in the original)76. 
Rocheleau et al. identify the core concerns of feminist political ecology as “survival; the right 
to live and work in a healthy environment; the responsibility to protect habitats, livelihoods, 
and systems of life support from contamination, depletion [...] and destruction; and the 
determination to restore or rehabilitate what has already been harmed.”77 
These observations, in foregrounding the imperative of survival and the centrality of 
responsibility in this endeavour, demonstrate important areas of commonality with the ethics 
of care. The salience of social vectors in shaping human activity features prominently in the 
context of care too, notably in Tronto’s work, identifying other significant influencing 
factors, beyond gender, notably race and class. 78 The fit with climate change is apparent as 
its impacts too are now widely recognised as gendered79 and aggravated by poverty and other 
societal constructs and ills.80 
While human relationships are central to the ethics of care and may be viewed as founded on 
respect for human vulnerability and a response of connection to it as motivational drivers, 
they cannot logically be regarded as the sole manifestation of relationship, vulnerability, or 
connection having salience for it. The ethics of care is sufficiently malleable to extend its 
reach, Stensota for example argues for a “notion of the ethics of care that is so broad as to 
encompass policies that we hitherto have not considered as care-relevant”81 and, as discussed 
above, she views environmental issues as (at least to a degree) falling within this expanded 
approach. While I agree with her willingness to take an expansive approach to care, and to 
view the environment as within its remit, my approach to the issue is rather different.  
Insofar as encompassing environmental considerations within care is concerned, rather than 
requiring an expansion of what is care-relevant, this instead involves a recognition that the 
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environment is in fact foundational to the ethics of care and is therefore inherent in it. This 
contention is founded on the interdependence of humanity and the environment which makes 
the environment both a necessary subject and object of care. The environment is not therefore 
only case-relevant to certain human care relationships or aspects thereof; rather it is integral 
to all inter-human care. Therefore, an environmentally rooted ethics of care does not in fact 
involve an expansion of care, but instead acknowledges the full ramifications of human 
situatedness in and our interdependence with/on the environment as the ultimate 
underpinning of the relational nature of all aspects of the human position/predicament. 
Relationship in the ethics of care then involves both human and environmental dimensions 
and the array of interactions between them, but even this does not fully encapsulate the 
complexity of what is in play. Marian Barnes argues that relationships are “essentially 
spatial.”82 I take the view that relationships are partially spatial, but only in the first instance, 
and that they also possess temporal dimensions (considered below) that are highly significant. 
That said, the spatial aspect of relationships of care is centrally important and worthy of fuller 
consideration as a foundational issue.  
In principle, an ethics of care could be approached in a manner akin to Wimberley’s construct 
of nested ecologies,83 which he describes as comprising: “an interlocking set of systems that 
begin at the level of the sense and extend to encompass families, groups, communities, 
ecosystems, the biosphere, and beyond into the unfathomable reaches of the cosmos.”84 
Wimberley applies the idea of ‘nesting’ as invoking “an integrated whole progressively based 
upon personal, social, environmental and cosmic ecologies.”85 An ethics of care also 
represents a  concept that can be addressed through systems theory and viewed as multi-
layered, and as radiating outwards. Thus, it begins with self-care and extends centrifugally,86 
applying (albeit in serially diminishing measure) to our families/ living units, our various and 
multi-layered communities, and ultimately to our species.  
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Wimberley’s nested ecologies also share functional links to the notion of care, expressed in 
the imperative need to address “our species-derived need to principally care for self and 
others like us, and thereafter to understand that our future on the planet is entirely dependent 
upon our readiness to extend care and consideration for all around us that is not human but 
upon which our very existence depends.”87 Practically and ethically88 nested layers of caring 
are foundationally based in the environment which we are both in and of is a matter of 
necessity, not choice.  
If we accept that all aspects of care are ecologically situated, then its spatial aspects too are 
necessarily multi-layered. In much the same way as Wimberley viewed human world views 
being located in interlocking natural, personal, and social ecologies, both human relationships 
of care and our care relationship with the environment, invoke a similarly nested approach. 
Thus, while the prime locus and focus of care inevitably lies in our nearest human concerns, 
it is also the case that there is no sustainable, viable care for one’s dependants that can be 
detached from our immediate surroundings, which are in turn dependent on wider 
ecosystems, and ultimately on the functionality of the biosphere.  
To be feasible then, an ethics of care must acknowledge that human and environmental 
concerns are inherently, intimately, and inseparably entangled. While the human and 
environmental dimensions of the sphere of concern, caring, capacity, and responsibility will 
focus most closely on the personal/family unit, determined in part by proximate spatial 
connection, they are not inherently limited to this domain and radiate outwards beyond this 
intimate starting point. Indeed, it is arguable that care-based ethics must extend beyond the 
particular (though admittedly in more dispersed forms as knowledge, involvement, and the 
potential for agency dwindle with distance) to embrace the variously composed contexts in 
which immediate personal care concerns are situated. The further reach of the spheres of care 
beyond the personal/familial/quasi familial may begin with local communities but has the 
potential to extend spatially, invoking (all or any of) local, national, regional, or global 
dimensions. Some aspects of a care focus will clearly be geographically anchored and 
constrained and focus on those perceived as ‘near’ to us, but they may still extend beyond the 
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immediate, other spheres of care will not be constrained in this way and may be regional and 
even potentially global (such as virtual communities of interest expressed through the 
internet) in reach and concerned with issues that affect large sections of humanity or 
humanity as a whole. This observation is prompted in part by an important aspect of 
planetary boundaries thinking, which seeks to link ecology and environmental science 
explicitly with society, and that, while its particular concern lies with global systems, is 
cognisant of the local and regional elements that comprise them.89 These ideas of connection, 
interconnection and embracing the potential multi-scalar implications of care raise interesting 
and important issues that go well beyond the confines of this chapter but which certainly 
warrant further research. 
While relationships as understood in an ethics of care setting must in the first instance be 
understood to be spatial in nature, as alluded to above, they are also enmeshed in temporal 
dimensions as suggested by Pulcini’s argument, digested by Stensota, that care “provides the 
only framework on which to base solidarity with future generations.”90 While this may be 
overstating the case (positing it as the only option being a very ambitious claim), the ethics of 
care approach does indeed provide a potentially viable basis for a principled approach to 
forward-looking thought and action. Here, as is the case with the spatial dimensions of care, 
the increasing imponderability of care priorities as we move further and further from our own 
time, suggests a level of care that, while founded on a minimum of ensuring the well-being of 
succeeding generations, will diminish the further into the future we gaze, as our responses 
become increasingly grounded on speculation. However, temporal dimensions of the ethics of 
care also need to look back to appreciate the constraints placed on our ability to exercise care 
by our predecessors, not least because it is crucial to grasp the importance of how, in the 
chain of human history, behaviours and decisions at one point in time can circumscribe the 
realm of viable action in future, a lesson that must be applied to the consequences of present 
(in)action on climate change.  
 
iii. Agency and Responsibility: Prompting and Promoting Care 
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The consideration of embodiment that requires the recognition of vulnerability also prompts 
reflection on the impacts of human agency on planetary systems and the constraints that 
planetary boundaries place upon us in this regard. While agency is a species-wide attribute, 
there is an enormous degree of variability in its strength and impact between classes of 
human actor. Agency too is however fundamentally gendered, and this can serve to mask the 
importance of care in this guise. Thus, while women’s caring roles often bring with them 
considerable environmental responsibility, garnering grounded knowledge of the 
environment, requiring skilled reading of conditions and responsive practices toward them, 
rather than this quotidian knowledge being seen as significant and a source of power, it is, for 
the most part, underplayed or disregarded.91  
Recognising human agency is a key mechanism of empowerment whereby responsibility can 
enveloped in the context of care and it is very telling that in the context of climate change, 
while women’s vulnerability has long been recognised, that their agency has only begun to 
come to the fore much more recently.92 Adopting Kretz’s approach, to questions of 
addressing what she terms the ‘theory-action gap,’ responsibility fits well with an ethics of 
care approach, as she points out that responsibility is “not about identifying who to blame and 
therefore hold accountable, an approach which enables one to ostensibly absolve oneself of 
responsibility. Responsibility is to be conceptualized in a forward looking, positive way—it is 
about taking responsibility through identifying how to help and acting accordingly.”93 
Stensota adds a further useful dimension to the concept of responsibility when she points to 
its potential to support a “more problem-related view and […] provide ways to incorporate 
contextual considerations”94 into human endeavours. Rocheleau et al. however observe the 
limitations imposed by dominant gendered approaches to responsibility inherent in the 
recognition (or lack thereof) of care-based roles:  
We recognize gendered environmental rights of control and access as well as 
responsibilities to procure and manage resources for the household and the community. 
These rights and responsibilities may apply to productive resources [...] or to the quality 
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of the environment. In addition to the gender division of resources, there is a gender 
division of power to preserve, protect, change, construct, rehabilitate, and restore 
environments and regulate the actions of others.95 
Relatedly, while a local contextualisation and recognition of women’s care and agency is 
essential,96 so too is an understanding of the impact of global issues on national and local 
contexts (and indeed vice versa) which also have impacts on agency and which, as the 
boundaries between the various levels of human endeavour become increasingly blurred have 
increasingly important implications.97 Rocheleau and her co-authors identified a number of 
important themes common to treatment of gender and environment worldwide drawn from 
multiple case studies; key among them being that both environmental science and the 
international environment movement have been fundamentally ‘cast in the domain of men’, 
mostly from the developed world, and have tended to ignore/devalue grassroots 
contributions, including, ‘daily management of the living landscape’ which served to  exclude 
women from the power that normally accompanies responsibility.98 Concomitantly, they 
observe that the status accorded to women and to caring functions tends to be low: 
 Women are perceived in terms of their roles as providers of labor and tenders of the 
 household, rather than as farmers and managers of the land or of other significant 
 means of livelihood. [implying the…] notion that women’s labor is infinitely 
 expandable, and that their domestic responsibilities (whether of a productive or 
 reproductive nature) are not particularly significant.99 
Thus, while women are acknowledged as being responsible for both human and 
environmental care functions, that responsibility is then largely divorced from power over the 
resources that they tend and rely upon and does not result in recognition and harnessing of 
their agency in caring for their households, communities,100 and the environments that sustain 
them.  
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IV. NOT SO MUCH A CONCLUSION, AS A CALL TO ACTION… 
While, as Rocheleau et al. observe, caring has long been devalued and readily open to 
criticism as an essentialised attribute of women, recent research suggests that care is in fact 
less easy to dismiss in this way, as it appears to be an integral part of humanity’s 
psychological make-up.101 This understanding could facilitate the reframing of the ethics of 
care to provide the necessary sense of perspective and impetus to promote broader human 
engagement with environmental constraints and specifically with climate change. This can be 
achieved by combining a science-based grasp of what human vulnerability means and how it 
applies to all of us, with an appreciation of the full scope of agency, harnessed to 
responsibility could contribute that socially enforced constraint that would promote planetary 
care in order to ameliorate the existential threat of climate change. Care for the life support 
system on which we rely is on one level, as it has always been, a matter of morality but 
ecological realism now suggests that it is now rapidly becoming a matter of necessity, not 
choice, if human self-care is to be realizable and sustainable. If both ethics and practicality 
point to the utility of adopting an ethics of care in our dealing with the environment this 
presents interesting possibilities, not least in tackling the atomism of modern life, recognising 
that: 
The myth of the individual has left us disconnected, lost, and pitiful102 
Relationship, (re)connection, with one another and with the non-human environment, and 
taking responsibility for the central human concerns that this entails is becoming imperative. 
Taking meaningful action on climate change is something that we can no longer allow states 
to deflect on to one another, like a game of pass the parcel at a children’s party:  if we 
continue to play as we have done, we will all lose. Nor can we continue as individuals to 
shirk our own responsibilities and expect state action alone to save us. Anthropogenic climate 
change truly is a human responsibility in the fullest sense—we are implicated at all levels of 
society.103 We will ultimately live or die as a species, by our ability to respond to the 
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Anthropocene, not only as expressed in understanding the systemic threats that we create104 
but also moving beyond endless talking about,105 to acting upon them in a meaningful way. 
Adopting an ethics of care approach, in retaining a centrally anthropocentric bent, makes the 
case for viewing our ecological position realistically and provides the necessary impetus and 
perspective to urge us towards a more effective approach to climate change than hitherto. It 
has much to offer in assimilating the importance of relationship, the implications of human 
vulnerability and our interconnections with one another and the environment, seeing them as 
motivational, prompting us to take responsibility for our actions through exercising agency 
and expressing this through the milieu of care vis-à-vis one another and the natural world. 
However, the ethics of care will not reach its full paradigm-shifting potential if, as is all too 
often the case with feminist perspectives, it is, “niched’ into women’s issues.”106 If it is seen 
for what it is, a different way of approaching difficult issues, an ethics of care approach offers 
emancipation from destructive ways of thinking and being, and the opportunity to re-vision 
inter-human and human /nature relationships in ways that offer the promise to sustain both 
humanity and the environment.  
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